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While it is widely accepted that music evokes moods, there is disagreement over whether
music-induced moods are relevant to the aesthetic appreciation of music as such. The
arguments against the aesthetic relevance of music-induced moods are: (1) moods cannot
be intentionally directed at the music and (2) music-induced moods are highly subjective
experiences and are therefore a kind of mind-wandering. This paper presents a novel
account of musical moods that avoids these objections. It is correct to say that a listener’s
entire mood is not relevant to the aesthetic appreciation of music. However, the experience
of mood consists of having different feelings. Music induces feelings that are intentionally
directed at themusic and clusters of these feelings can be recognized as typical of a speciﬁc
mood. Therefore, mood-feelings are relevant to the aesthetic appreciation of music.
Keywords: music and emotion, mood, aesthetic emotion, philosophy of music, vitality affects, emotional
expressivity, emotional arousal
INTRODUCTION
In everyday life, moods and music seem to be linked. You might
listen to sad music after having gone through a breakup or to ener-
getic songs to improve your mood instead. Some philosophers
maintain that music evokes moods and that they are important to
the appreciation of music, while others argue that even if music
induces moods, they are irrelevant to the aesthetic experience. By
“the aesthetic experience of music” I mean the listener’s evaluative
experience of the music which constitutes the listener’s belief that
the music has aesthetic value. This is broader than just the enjoy-
ment of music. There is disagreement on what is to be included
in this appreciative experience. The arguments against the aes-
thetic relevance of music-induced moods are: (1) moods do not
have intentional objects and therefore cannot be directed at the
music (Zangwill, 2004) and (2) music-induced moods are a kind
of mind-wandering, as they are personal and vary from listener
to listener (Kivy, 2006, 2007). I will present a new account which
claims that moods are indeed relevant to the aesthetic experience,
but avoids these criticisms. The relation between feeling andmood
has been overlooked in the debate on music and mood: musical
moods should be considered clusters of feelings and music feels
the way moods feel.
THE VALUE OF MUSICAL MOODS
The following arguments have been given in favor of the rele-
vance of moods for the aesthetic experience of music. The debate
mostly deals with absolute or instrumental music, but for the
sake of brevity I will use the word “music.” Drawing on empirical
research (for exampleKrumhansl, 1997; Juslin and Sloboda, 2001),
Robinson (2005) ascribes a speciﬁc role to moods in appreciating
music. The mood the music evokes, can help the listener to focus
on the expressive qualities of the music. Since moods create bias,
moods can affect, for instance, the way we perceive. If we are in
a happy mood, we are more inclined to think that the faces we
encounter look happy (Niedenthal et al., 2001). In the same way
Robinson wants to argue that music elicits a mood which will help
to focus the listener’s attention more on the speciﬁc expressive
qualities of the music. For instance, the languorous mood evoked
by listening to Debussy’s “Prélude à l’après-midi d’un faune” plays
an important role in appreciating the languorous quality of the
music.
Carroll (2003), Carroll and Moore (2007) also defends the
importance of moods in appreciating the expressiveness of music,
arguing that music cannot express only an emotion but can also
express a mood. The appreciation of L’après-midi largely consist
in recognizing it as expressive of a languorous mood. Music is not
only expressive of mood, but it also evokes moods. Carroll points
out that the evocation of a mood can help in the recognition of
the expressed mood in the music, as the evoked mood aids the
discovery of meaning and movement in the music. The listener
represents the movement of the music in imagination and bodily
sensation. The evoked feelings of movement are associated with
moods and this helps, on Carroll’s account, to appreciate a musical
piece aesthetically.
OBJECTIONS
NO INTENTIONALITY, NO USE FOR MOODS
Zangwill (2004) argues that since a mood lacks an intentional
object, it cannot have music as its intentional object and therefore
it is not relevant to the aesthetic experience as such. The intentional
object of a mental state is that which the state is about and directed
toward. A mental state is intentional if it is directed at or represents
something. An emotion is directed at an intentional object: if you
are angry, you are always angry at someone or something. A mood
such as melancholy, on the other hand, does not have a speciﬁc
intentional object. It might be caused by a particular event, but
it is not directed at anything. A breakup can cause a melancholic
mood, but the melancholy itself functions as a background state
which is directed at everything and nothing. Robinson accepts
this analysis of mood, saying that “although it is the music that
makes me feel sad, I’m not sad about the music” (Robinson, 2010,
p. 667).
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Zangwill argues that although music conveys moods, it does
not follow that it is relevant to the aesthetic appreciation of music
as such. He rightly assumes that everything that is relevant to the
aesthetic experience of music, must have music as its intentional
object, because otherwise itwouldnot be an experience“of”music.
Since a mood does not have an intentional object it cannot have
music as its intentional object. Therefore, moods are not relevant
to the aesthetic experience of music.
MIND-WANDERING
Another objection against the aesthetic importance of musically
evokedmoods is formulated byKivy (2006,2007).While Robinson
and Carroll maintain that music-induced moods help the listener
to understand the expressive qualities of the music, Kivy considers
moods irrelevant. He describes his view as enhanced formalism
and argues that the expressivity of instrumental music is not felt,
but recognized (Kivy, 2002). In other words, it is through our
thoughts, not our moods, that we discover music’s expressivity.
Instrumental music may be expressive of moods, but this expres-
sivity is only recognized by attending to the formal aspects of the
music. In order to recognize “L’après-midi” as expressive of a lan-
guorous mood, the listener does not have to be in a languorous
mood.
Kivy’s enhanced formalismpresupposes that there is a canonical
way of listening to music. This is the appreciation of the formal
qualities of music, which represents the meaning of the music as
it was meant to be. This canonical way of listening is free from
personal associations. Music may induce moods and other kinds
of personal associations, but they are not part of the appreciation
of music as a ﬁne art (Kivy, 2006, 2007). “L’après-midi” always
gets Lucy into a languorous mood, while if Jack listens to it, it
brings back childhoodmemorieswhichmake himnostalgic. These
personal associations and moods are highly subjective and are
therefore not part of the aesthetic appreciation of music as such.
The listener loses herself in mind-wandering, instead of focusing
on the music.
MUSICAL MOODS ARE CLUSTERS OF FEELINGS
That musical moods are aesthetically valuable is an intuition I
sharewithCarroll andRobinson. However, if moods are not inten-
tional it is indeed problematic to argue that moods are relevant to
the aesthetic appreciation of music, but maybe moods can be con-
ceived of as intentional after all. Michael Tye has developed such an
account and claims that the philosophical orthodoxy on the topic
of moods is wrong (Tye, 1995, pp. 93–131). Drawing on the work
of neuroscientist Damasio (1994), Tye argues that we experience
a mood if we feel a change in our body. Most of the time we are
in a neutral state, but when we feel our bodies change in a certain
way, we are experiencing a speciﬁc mood. So Tye offers a different
understanding of mood: the felt character of mood consists of
feelings, which have intentional objects. What it means for feel-
ings to have intentional objects, is something I will address later
on. The relation between music and feelings has been discussed,
but this always remained separate from the debate on music and
moods. My proposal is that if the experience of a mood is a cluster
of feelings, we can introduce feelings to the debate on music and
mood.
This provides a new account of musical moods, one which
meets Kivy’s and Zangwill’s objections. The idea is that each mood
is associated with a speciﬁc cluster of feelings. This does not mean
that if you experience feelings X, Y, and Z it is necessarily implied
that you havemoodM. Everymood is different, and denominating
moods is not a matter of logical inference. We usually ﬁnd it hard
to precisely describe every speciﬁc feeling we are experiencing.
Nevertheless, if someone says that she in a “energetic” mood, we
can get a sense of which feelings she might have. I will argue
that music evokes certain feelings which can be associated with
a speciﬁc mood. So I need to show that bodily feelings can be
directed at the music and that clusters of these feelings are part of
the aesthetic experience of the music.
Tye argues that bodily feelings have intentionality in the same
way as emotions do (Tye, 1995, pp. 93–131). As I explained ear-
lier, a mental state is intentional if it is directed at or represents
something. For instance, the feeling of pain represents, according
to Tye, a particular part of the body (i.e., the intentional object)
as damaged. Each speciﬁc type of pain represent a speciﬁc type
of damage: a little twinge of pain, for instance, represents a part
of the body as being just mildly damaged. So for a mental state
to represent the intentional object “as” something, means that a
mental state is directed at an object and attributes information or
content to it. In this sense feelings can be directed at intentional
objects and represent them as something.
In order to explain what it means for a feeling to represent
something in the context of music, it is helpful to look at a speciﬁc
type of feeling which Damasio calls “background feelings”(Dama-
sio, 2003, pp. 83–84), a notion inspired by philosopher Langer
(1957) and developmental psychologist Stern (1985). Interestingly
both Langer and Stern relate these feelings to music appreciation.
Stern calls these feelings “vitality affects.” They are different from
other feelings like the sensation of pain, pleasure, and hunger, in
the sense that they represent dynamics. Vitality affects are inten-
tionally directed at dynamic structures and they represent them
as “surging, fading-away, ﬂeeting, explosive, tentative, effortful,
accelerating, decelerating, climaxing, bursting, and drawn out”
(Stern, 1999, p. 68). In other words they represent actions in
a speciﬁc way. When, for instance, an infant gets fed by her
father, she not only perceives that her father is feeding her, but
she also feels that when the spoon reaches her mouth the father
moves his arm as if his action (i.e., the intentional object) is “cli-
maxing.” Stern claims that infants can, long before they develop
linguistic thought, can “represent these (dynamic experiences) in
some non-verbal kinesthetic and bodily manner” (Stern, 2010,
p. 69–70). This climaxing way of movement is not represented
in thought, but is felt in the infant’s body, through her vitality
affects.
Stern himself contends that these vitality affects occur while lis-
tening to music (Stern, 2010). Music has “dynamic aspects” such
as crescendo, tension, and release. These dynamic aspects can be
thought of in terms of vitality affects which represent them as
“explosive,” “bursting,” or “drawn out.” Stern links the concept
of vitality affects to Langer’s morphology of feeling (Stern, 2010,
p. 37). Langer argues that music does not represent emotions as
such, but rather the dynamics of feelings. Music is a symbolic rep-
resentation of affective dynamics. “There are certain aspects of the
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so-called“inner life”– physical or mental which have formal prop-
erties similar to those of music – patterns of motion and rest, of
tension and release, of agreement and disagreement, preparation,
fulﬁllment excitation, sudden change, etc.” (Langer, 1957, p. 228)
In order to describe the structural likeness of symbolical musical
movements and the dynamics of our affective lives, Langer refers
to psychologist Carroll Pratt’s famous dictum that music “merely
sound[s] the way moods feel. . .” (Pratt, 1931, p. 203). As it are
our vitality affects and not our ears that represent the musical
dynamics of motion and tension as “explosive” or “bursting,” it
might be better to say that music effectively feels the way moods
feel.
Zangwill and Kivy rightly maintain that an entire mood cannot
be relevant to the aesthetic experience of music as such. However,
Tye claims that experienced moods consist of different feelings.
Some of these feelings, I will argue, are not directed at the music
while others may very well be part of the aesthetic experience.
Music evokes vitality affects and a cluster of these vitality affects
can be recognized as typical of a speciﬁc mood. That is what con-
stitutes a “musical mood,” i.e., a cluster of vitality affects directed
at the music. This argument is similar to Carroll’s, who claims that
evoked bodily sensations of movement are associated with moods.
I, however, think that it is important to distinguish between
the “musical mood,” and the general mood that the listener
is in.
This can be seen in the following example. Juliet attends a con-
cert with her boyfriend, Romeo, and is in a very good mood.
Juliet feels relaxed, in balance and senses a warm feeling of inner
wellness. Some of these feelings are related to her bodily state,
while other feelings are related to the presence of Romeo: the
nice feeling of being on a the date and the loving feelings which
are directed at Romeo. Also, the music itself may evoke certain
vitality affects such as the feelings of “surging,” “fading-away,”
and “ﬂeeting.” These vitality affects, associated with a relaxed
mood are part of the mood she is experiencing. In this case the
cluster of vitality affects evoked by the music and the feelings
she had before the concert are similar. Still, it would be wrong
to say that Juliet’s entire mood is part of the aesthetic experi-
ence, since only the particular feelings which are directed at the
music are.
Consider another case in which the general mood the lis-
tener is in and the musical mood are distinct. Before entering
the music hall Juliet and Romeo have a heated argument. The
music starts, but Juliet is still in an angry mood. The guilty look
of Romeo annoys her and she is irritated by the tall man sitting
in front of her. As Juliet feels a lot of tension in her body, she
feels uncomfortable and has problems sitting still. Nevertheless,
the music sounds very relaxing to her: the melody ﬂows slowly
and in a relaxed way to its climax and then fades away again.
The music sounds harmonious, as if every note falls into place.
The cluster of feelings that the music evokes is associated with a
relaxed mood, so Juliet experiences the music as a relaxed mood,
although her overall experience is one of mixed feelings. Some
of the feelings she experiences are related to the angry mood
she was in when the concert started. The other feelings, that
the music evoked, are associated with a relaxed mood. In this
case there is a difference between the musical mood, which is
relaxed and Juliet’s initial angry mood. She experiences the music
as relaxing, while her overall mood is an experience of mixed
feelings.
This illustrates the idea that the listener’s entire mood is not
relevant to aesthetic experience of music as such. However, musi-
cal moods are distinct from the listener’s general mood. Moods
consist of different feelings and musical moods are clusters of
music-induced feelings that are paradigmatic for a speciﬁc mood.
The languorous mood of “L’après-midi” consists of the cluster
of feelings the music evokes, which are paradigmatic for a lan-
guorous mood. It is not the entire mood of the listener that is
supposed to be languorous, but the music feels languorous never-
theless. Therefore I propose that the dictum “music feels the way
moods feel” is a good way of describing the aesthetic relevance of
moods.
OBJECTIONS RECONSIDERED
Distinguishing between feelings associated with a mood and an
entire mood provides a response to Zangwill’s and Kivy’s crit-
icisms. Zangwill maintains that since moods lack intentional
objects, the music you are listening to can never be the inten-
tional object of the mood you are experiencing. However, the
vitality affects are not simply caused by the music, they also rep-
resent its dynamics in a speciﬁc way. Thus, vitality affects have the
dynamic aspects of the music as intentional objects, and therefore,
the intentionality requirement is met and vitality affects can be
part of the aesthetic experience as such.
Kivy argues that experiencing music-induced moods is mind-
wandering; only attending to the formal qualities of music is
essential to the canonical listening practice. Vitality affects, how-
ever, are a quick and dirty way of detecting the music’s dynamical
aspects and represent expressive formal aspects of the music.
If there is such a thing as a canonical listening practice, then
these vitality affects are part of it and therefore Kivy’s criti-
cism can be avoided. Kivy’s account is disembodied since he
excludes everything that is felt in the body, while in my account
the embodied experienced of music is essential for its aesthetic
appreciation.
CONCLUSION
The relation between mood and feeling has been overlooked in the
literature on the aesthetic experience of music. Zangwill and Kivy
rightly argue that the listener’s entire mood is not relevant to the
aesthetic appraisal of music. I have contended that the experience
of a mood consists of different feelings and some of these feel-
ings are directed at the music, while others are not. The feelings
directed at the music are vitality affects. Some clusters of these
feelings can be recognized as typical feelings of a particular mood.
Consequentlywe can say thatmusic feels thewaymoods feel. These
theoretical considerations show that the musical experience is not
disembodied: the way music affects our bodies is an important
aspect of aesthetic appreciation. I am hopeful that these theoret-
ical considerations will inspire empirical research that explores
further the relation between feeling, mood and music. Instead
of focusing on which music is related to which mood, it might be
fruitful to consider bodily feelings asmediators betweenmood and
music.
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